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Abstract International climate policies are being shaped in a process of ongoing
negotiations. This paper develops a sequential game framework to explore the stability of
international climate agreements allowing for multiple renegotiations. We analyse how the
incentives to reach an international climate agreement in the first period will be impacted by
the prospect of further negotiations in later periods and by the punishment options related
to renegotiations. For this purpose we introduce a dynamic model of coalition formation
with twelve world regions that captures the key features of the climate-economy impacts
of greenhouse gas emissions. For a model with one round of renegotiations we find that a
coalition of China and the United States is the unique renegotiation proof equilibrium. In
a game with more frequent renegotiations we find that the possibility to punish defecting
players helps to stabilise larger coalitions in early stages of the game. Consequently, several
renegotiation proof equilibria emerge that outperform the coalition of China and USA in
terms of abatement levels and global payoff. The Grand Coalition, however, is unstable.
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1 Introduction
The control of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is a global public benefit. In the absence of
global institutions underprovision of GHG abatement is expected and well understood. Less
understood are conditions under which effective international climate agreements (ICAs)
might emerge and which mechanisms might help to stabilise agreements. Recent literature
on the stability of ICAs has focused on ‘once and forever’ models of negotiations, e.g. Hoel
(1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Botteon and Carraro (1997), and Finus et al. (2006).
However, the Conference of Parties meetings of the UNFCCC clearly illustrate that nego-
tiating GHG emission controls is a process rather than a matter of striking an agreement.
Furthermore, as the commitment period 2008–2012 agreed upon in the Kyoto protocol has
started, there is a need to look ahead. Hence, the formation of ICAs is probably best under-
stood in a sequential game framework.
The starting point of our analysis is that the prospect of renegotiations at a later stage
might change the incentives to join a coalition and, therefore, it might change participation
at an earlier stage. In this paper we examine whether the possibility of renegotiations hamper
or help the formation of stable coalitions, and whether renegotiations will lead to agreements
with higher or lower levels of abatement. The stability concept frequently used in coalition
formation games is that of internal and external stability where no coalition member has an
incentive to leave and no player outside the coalition has an incentive to join (d’Aspremont
et al. 1983). This concept of stability is, however, no longer adequate in a game with renego-
tiations. As we study a sequential game we employ the equilibrium concept of Renegotiation
Proof Equilibrium (RPE). The initial idea was developed by Bernheim (1987), Bernheim
and Ray (1989), and Farrell and Maskin (1989). It has been applied to study international
environmental agreements by Finus and Rundshagen (1998) in a two-player game. In our
context a RPE is a sequence of coalitions1 (or ICAs) such that (i) the path of play is subgame
perfect, i.e. a Nash equilibrium is played at every subgame, and (ii) there is no subgame
where a Pareto dominated Nash equilibrium is played. Subgame perfectness ensures that a
player who defects from an equilibrium can be punished in the subsequent play of the game.
In order to be credible, the punishment path of play must be such that no player has an incen-
tive to deviate, i.e. the punishment will be carried out if a player deviates. Pareto dominated
equilibria are ruled out because they would not survive renegotiation.
The topic of renegotiations has attracted a lot of attention in the recent literature on inter-
national environmental agreements. Barrett (1994, 1999) considers an infinitely repeated
game. For such games, according to the folk theorem, the full cooperative outcome is gener-
ally supported by an equilibrium if discount rates are sufficiently close to zero (Fudenberg
and Maskin 1986). The folk theorem applies when players can commit to some future path
of play. If a commitment mechanism is lacking, renegotiations limit the possibility of cred-
ible punishment of free-rider behaviour. Hence, Barrett (1994, 1999) finds that infinitely
repeated play does not guarantee full participation in international environmental agree-
ments. Barrett’s (1999) model has recently been extended by Asheim et al. (2006). They
show that two regional agreements may outperform a single global agreement when large
global coalitions cannot be stabilised. Na and Shin (1998) consider coalition formation with
uncertain environmental benefits. Analysing a three-country, two-period model where new
information becomes available in the second period they argue that new information may
be detrimental to coalition stability. While a coalition of three countries, which are assumed
to be identical ex ante, is stable, the coalition might break apart when information becomes
1 We refer to the situation where no agreement is formed and all players are singletons as a ‘trivial’ coalition.
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available revealing differences between countries. Rubio and Ulph (2002) examine coalition
stability in a two-period model with a stock pollutant. Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2007) further
extend this model type to examine stability of ICAs under uncertainty and learning. The later
models, unlike Na and Shin’s model, are general with respect to the number of countries.
Recently Rubio and Ulph (2007) and De Zeeuw (2008) have studied difference games of
coalition membership in an infinite time horizon model. De Zeeuw uses farsighted stability
as the solution concept. Rubio and Ulph’s (2007) work is closest to our study. Their model
and ours are both cartel games, i.e. it is assumed that the coalition formed is unique. Rubio
and Ulph employ the solution concept of internal and external stability; we use a refinement
of the same solution concept. There are two major differences, however. Rubio and Ulph
work with a model with identical players and an infinite time horizon. Our model allows for
heterogeneous players but the time horizon is finite. The latter allows us to employ backward
induction. Rubio and Ulph find that coalition membership declines over time. Although this
finding concurs with our results, the reasons for this finding are very different. This will be
explained in more detail below.
Common to all these modelling approaches is, however, the assumption that all countries
are identical, at least ex ante. This is a serious limitation for most practical applications of
models of coalition stability and in particular for models of ICAs.2 There are two impor-
tant motives to relax the assumption of identical countries. First, differences in abatement
cost and benefits can induce cooperation as cheap abatement options can be better exploited.
Second, asymmetry makes transfers effective that further help to stabilise agreements. Applied
modelling approaches have employed integrated assessment models to obtain simulation
results for heterogeneous players. Ciscar and Soria (2002), for example, have considered
a sequential game of the formation of climate policies, but they do not consider coalition
formation. In an empirically rich model with 26 regions Babiker (2001) finds that a coalition
of OECD countries is not stable, but he cannot provide general insights in the existence of
stable coalitions. A systematic screening for stable climate agreements has been conducted
by Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) who check stability for all 56 coalitions in a 6-regions
model. Finus et al. (2006) use a larger 12-regions model to examine stability of ICAs. How-
ever, these latter approaches use a one-shot game model. Germain et al. (2003) use a dynamic
model to explore core-stability. However, their analysis is confined to three regions.
What is lacking in the literature, however, are dynamic models of coalition formation that
allow for heterogeneous players. Hence, this paper aims at filling a gap between the theoret-
ical models (with general results and identical players) and empirical models (which allow
for different costs and benefits of abatement of GHGs across regions, but which give little
general insight in the stability of ICAs). Note that we leave the study of the impact of uncer-
tainty and learning to future work.3 The merit of our model is that we present a dynamic
GHG abatement game with an empirically relevant specification, asymmetric players and
renegotiations.
We develop a sequential game where at each stage (commitment period) the players
(regions) announce whether they join a unique international climate coalition or not.4 Then,
for given membership of the ICA, the ICA and the singletons choose abatement efforts
to maximise their respective net benefits (cf. Chander and Tulkens 1995). We identify the
2 How different incentives to join an ICA do in fact influence coalition membership, is demonstrated by
Weikard et al. (2006) and McGinty (2007).
3 Dellink et al. (2008) is a starting point in the domain of applied modelling.
4 Due to computational complexity we do not consider multiple coalitions in our model with renegotiations.
See Sáiz et al. (2006) for an analysis of multiple coalitions in a one-shot coalition formation game.
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renegotiation proof equilibria for a finite sequential game, which reflects the fact that fossil
fuels—the major source of GHGs—are depletable. We extend the Stability of Coalitions
model (STACO) introduced by Finus et al. (2006) and refined by Nagashima et al. (2009).
STACO is a 12-regions integrated assessment model that consists of abatement and damage
costs modules. STACO calculates the pay-offs of all possible coalitions and performs sin-
gle-deviation stability checks. Details of the calibration of STACO are described in Sect. 3
below. We investigate the impact of the frequency of renegotiations, ranging from two to five
over our time horizon of 100 years and identify renegotiation proof sequences of ICAs.
Our findings can be summarised as follows. If there is no or just one round of renegotia-
tions, i.e. not more than two commitment periods, we have a unique RPE consisting of USA
and China. The uniqueness of the equilibrium does not allow for any punishment. With more
than two commitment periods we find multiple equilibria so that threats of punishment can be
installed. A region that is supposed to cooperate in an equilibrium, but free-rides, can be pun-
ished by playing the RPE that gives the worst payoff to that region in the subgame that follows.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our model of negotiations and rene-
gotiations on greenhouse gas emissions reduction. Section 3 provides the calibration of the
STACO model. Section 4 presents results for the one-shot game as a benchmark and examines
games with multiple negotiation rounds. We consider the effects of timing and frequency of
renegotiations. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Game
We consider a game with a finite number R(1 ≤ R < ∞) of renegotiation stages where a
cartel formation game with open membership is the stage game. At each stage r = 1, . . . , R
players decide whether or not to join a unique coalition (the cartel). Then the coalition and
the remaining players simultaneously set their GHG abatement levels. Our game is not a
repeated game as the stage games are not identical. This is due to the fact that we allow for
growth in the economy and technical progress leading to a reduction of abatement costs over
time. More formally, let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of players (regions). We adopt a discrete
time model with a finite planning horizon T . Periods are denoted by t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Every
player i chooses whether or not to sign an ICA at an initial stage (r = 1 and t (r) = 1) and
at each renegotiation stage r = 2, . . . , R. In what follows we label the initial negotiation
also ‘renegotiation’. Hence r ∈ {1, . . . , R} and we can denote a moment of renegotiation
as t (r) ∈ {1, . . . , T }. There are R ≤ T renegotiations. The model allows for multiple
renegotiations at arbitrary renegotiation times.
The stage game consists of a membership game followed by an abatement game. In
the membership game, at each stage r = 1, . . . , R each region i ∈ N adopts a strategy
σi,r ∈ {no,yes}, where σi,r =no means that i is not joining the coalition at stage r and
σi,r =yes means that i is joining the coalition at stage r . This membership game determines
a coalition Kr ⊆ N that forms at time t (r).
The membership game is followed by an abatement game. We assume that each region
i has a path of baseline emissions (e¯i,1, . . . , e¯i,T ) specifying uncontrolled emissions e¯i,t
at each time t up to the planning horizon T . For ease of reference we denote such paths
by 〈e¯i〉T1 ≡ (e¯i,1, . . . , e¯i,T ). Each player adopts an abatement path (pollution control strat-
egy) 〈qi〉T1 ≡ (qi,1, . . . , qi,T ) from the set of feasible abatement paths. A path is feasible
if for all regions i ∈ N , region i’s abatement never exceeds its baseline emissions, i.e.
qi,t ∈ [0, e¯i,t ] for all t . The abatement path is determined in a sequence of decisions at times
t (r), r = 1, . . . , R. For example, if we have three renegotiation stages, then R = 3. Suppose
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renegotiation periods are t (1) = 1, t (2) = s and t (R) = s′, then the relevant partition of the








For the costs and benefits of abatement we consider that greenhouse gas abatement is a





and incurs costs Ci(〈qi〉T1 ) for own abatement. These benefits and costs determine a gross
payoff before transfers. Denoting the vector of regional abatement levels by














We assume that members of a given coalition Kr formed at time t (r) will adopt abatement
paths to maximise the joint payoff of the coalition. Non-members seek to maximise their own
payoff. This defines a difference game played by the coalition and the singleton players. In
Appendix 1 we show that the abatement game has a unique interior solution for the STACO
specification of benefit and cost functions (cf. Sect. 3).5 This solution of the stage r abate-















uniqueness of the solution allows us, for convenience, to transform gross payoffs defined on
the domain of stage r abatement paths πri 〈q〉t (r+1)−1t (r) to payoffs defined on the domain of
coalitions. Furthermore, we assume that a coalition Kr ⊆ N can arrange financial transfers
Fi(K
r) to redistribute gross payoffs between members. We require that
∑
i∈K Fi(Kr) = 0
and Fj (Kr) = 0 for j /∈ Kr . We obtain, then, a stage r valuation function that gives the


















Hence, the sequential game we specify has R stages where at every stage r a n-player
membership game is played, followed by n − |Kr | + 1-player abatement game where the
coalition payoff is distributed among its members.
The game is solved by backward induction. Consider the renegotiations at times
t (1), . . . , t (r), . . . , t (R). At the time of the final renegotiation t (R) there is an inherited
stock of GHGs resulting from past emissions. Benefits from abatement depend on the stock
of GHGs. In general this precludes a simple application of backward induction as the game
in the final stage depends on the path of play in earlier stages due to the stock pollutant.
In the STACO specification, however, although benefits in later stages depend on stock of
GHGs and, therefore, the earlier path of play, marginal benefits are independent of the stock
of GHGs. In this setting it is possible to determine the Nash equilibrium abatement path








Next, given the payoffs for all coalitions KR ⊆ N we determine the equilibria of the
membership game. At the final stage we have a one-shot game where the standard definitions
of stability apply (cf. d’Aspremont et al. 1983):
5 This type of solution has been called ‘Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium’ by Chander and Tulkens (1995).
Coalition members have signed a binding agreement. The coalition and the remaining singleton players play
a Cournot-Nash game.
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for all i ∈ KR .
External stability: A coalition KR is externally stable if and only if vRi
(
KR
) ≥ vRi (KR
∪ {i}) for all i ∈ N\KR .
Stability: A coalition KR is stable if and only if it is internally and externally stable.
Obviously, the set of stable coalitions coincides with the set of (subgame perfect) Nash
equilibria of the stage-R game. Renegotiation proofness requires the following:
Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium: A sequence of coalitions is a RPE if and only if (i) the
corresponding strategy profiles are a subgame perfect equilibrium and (ii) in every sub-
game the equilibrium outcome is Pareto undominated by any other equilibrium outcome
of the subgame.
In general, we denote the set of RPE of the r subgame by r . Typical elements of r are
sequences of coalitions denoted by ψr = (Kr, . . . , KR). Consider a sequence ψr ∈ r . We
will write the valuation of the r subgame as V ri (ψr) ≡ vri (Kr) + · · · + vRi (KR).
Now consider the renegotiation at an earlier stage r < R. We have to distinguish two
situations. If the RPE of the r + 1 subgame is unique, i.e. r+1 contains a single element,
backward induction is straightforward to apply. In this case, at time t (r) each region knows
that it will receive the unique RPE payoff of the r + 1 subgame at stage r + 1. Then, for a
given coalition Kr formed at stage r the relevant payoffs are
vri (K



















are independent of earlier play as discussed before. Since there is a unique
equilibrium of the r + 1 subgame, later play cannot affect the decision at stage r either.
If the r +1 subgame equilibrium is not unique, we have to consider the set of RPE, r+1.
In this case, the subgame perfect equilibria of the r subgame may include equilibria where
membership of player i is induced by the threat that an equilibrium which is bad for i will
be played in the continuation game. Denote by wr+1i the worst equilibrium path of play for
player i, such that V r+1i (ψr+1) ≥ V r+1i (wr+1i ) for all ψr+1 ∈ r+1. Then a coalition Kr
followed by ψr+1 is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage r subgame if and only if for
all i ∈ Kr
vri (K
r\{i}) − vri (Kr) ≤ V r+1i
(
ψr+1





and for all i ∈ N\Kr
vri (K
r ∪ {i}) − vri (Kr) ≤ V r+1i
(
ψr+1





Equation (4) requires that the gain a coalition member receives from defecting from coali-
tion Kr at stage r must be no greater than the loss from a punishment in the form wr+1i being
played instead of ψr+1. Equation (5) requires that the gain of a singleton player from entering
coalition Kr must be no greater than the loss from a punishment in the form of wr+1i being
played instead of ψr+1 from stage r + 1 onwards. Notice that the punishment play wr+1i is
in fact a credible punishment, because, by definition, wr+1i is a RPE. As an RPE, w
r+1
i is
Pareto undominated and, hence, there must be at least one player who does not have a better
option than to play wr+1i and, therefore, the punishment will be carried out. Equations (4)
and (5) are generalisations of the notions of internal and external stability, respectively.
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The set of RPE of the stage-r subgame are the subgame perfect equilibria that are Pareto
undominated by any other equilibrium outcome of the stage-r subgame.
3 Calibration of the STACO Model
In our setting with heterogeneous players general results on the composition and size of stable
coalitions cannot be obtained. Hence, for further analysis we employ a specification of bene-
fits and costs of abatement and a transfer scheme with an empirically meaningful parameter
calibration and obtain further insights through numerical simulations. This section explains
the calibration of our model which we label STACO-2.2. The model refines STACO 2.1.
(Nagashima et al. 2009) in order to examine the impact of renegotiations. Here, we focus on
the main features of the model. We consider twelve world regions: USA, Japan (JPN), Euro-
pean Union-15 (EU15), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern European countries (EET),
former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), China (CHN), India (IND),
dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and rest of the world (ROW). We account
for the benefits of abatement to infinity, but adopt a shorter planning horizon of 100 years,
ranging from 2011 to 2110, for determining abatement paths. In this setting the intertemporal
aspects of climate change are well reflected.6 Within the planning horizon there are R rounds
of renegotiations. This limits the duration of the initial and any further international climate
agreement. Below we present empirical results for R = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 with equal length of
stages. Hence for R = 5, for example, we have renegotiations at t = 1, 21, 41, 61, 81 where
coalitions are formed and abatement decisions are taken.
The basic model equations are presented in Box 1. Appendix 2 gives an overview of the
model parameters. First we calibrate the benefit function for each region and each period.
Benefits from abatement are avoided damages which, in turn, depend on stock of CO2. Dam-
ages are derived from the damage cost module of the DICE model (Nordhaus 1994) and the
climate module by Germain and Van Steenberghe (2003). The stock of CO2 for each period
Mt is given in Eq. 6. Stock depends on the stock in the previous period Mt−1, a natural equi-
librium stock M¯ , a decay rate δ, baseline (or uncontrolled) emissions e¯i,t , abatement qi,t and
the airborne fraction of emissions that remains in the atmosphere ω.7 We use data for CO2
emissions derived from the EPPA model (Reilly 2005). The damage function is a function
of the stock of CO2 and can be approximated by a linear function. In Eq. 7 yt denotes global
GDP in year t . We assume a GDP growth rate of about 2% annually, using data from the
DICE model. Parameters γ1 and γ2 are estimated by OLS-regression (Dellink et al. 2004);
for the global damage parameter γD , we use the estimate by Tol (1997) that damages amount
to 2.7% of GDP for a doubling of CO2 stock over pre-industrial levels. Equation (8) shows
the global benefits of abatement depending on stock.
Each region receives a share θi of the global benefits, as displayed in Appendix 2, Table 8;
see Eq. 9. Benefits are the sum of per-period benefits discounted at rate ρ; see Eq. 10. Equa-
tion 11 gives the marginal benefits from current abatement (discounted back to period t).
We specify the abatement cost functions following the estimates of the EPPA model by
Ellerman and Decaux (1998). In Eq. 12 α and β are regional cost parameters. We assume
exogenous technological progress which is modelled as a reduction of current abatement
6 Admittedly, we assume that no thresholds or irreversibilities in the climate system are relevant for the time
period under consideration.
7 This representation of the carbon cycle is extremely simplified but, as our focus is on the analysis of stability
of ICAs, it suffices our needs (cf. Nagashima et al. 2009).
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costs at an annual rate ς . Equations (13) and (14) specify discounted and marginal abatement
costs, respectively.
Based on this specification of benefits and costs, Eq. 15 gives the gross payoff in net
present value terms of the stage r abatement game.
For our investigation of the impact of transfers among the regions within a coalition we
assume surplus sharing between coalition members; see Weikard et al. (2006) and Nagashima
et al. (2009).8 As explained in Sect. 2, the coalition maximises its joint payoff in the abate-
ment game. Equilibrium abatement levels are unique (see Appendix 1) and labelled qKri,t . The
coalition surplus St (Kr) Eq. 16 is defined as the joint gain of the coalition members over their
joint payoff if no coalition is formed (labelled ‘All-Singletons’). The sharing rule assigns a
share λi,t ∈ [0, 1] of the coalition surplus St (Kr) to every coalition member i ∈ K such that∑
i∈K λi,t = 1 for all t . The shares are proportional to baseline emissions as specified in
Eq. 17.9 Implementing surplus sharing involves a financial transfer between coalition mem-
bers. In Eq. 18 stage-r transfers are specified as the benchmark payoff each player receives
under All-Singletons plus a share of the coalition surplus accumulated over all stage r peri-
ods minus its gross payoff. One of the main advantages of surplus sharing is that individual
rationality is always satisfied as long as a coalition is profitable at all, i.e. coalition members
will always gain compared to All-Singletons. Note that all transfers are arranged within a
given commitment period r . Moreover, Eq. 19 states that singletons do not participate in the
transfer scheme. Hence, the stage r payoff is given by the gross payoffs from equilibrium
abatement plus the transfer; see Eq. 20. Equation (21) gives total payoff for a region where
ψ1 is the sequence of coalitions K1, . . . , KR .
4 Results
This section presents the results from STACO 2.2. We first present, as a benchmark, the one-
shot game without renegotiations (Sect. 4.1). We investigate incentives for cooperation and
identify which coalitions are stable. Then, we study the effects of renegotiations in a model
with a first round of initial negotiations and one round of renegotiations (Sect. 4.2.), and a
first round of initial negotiations and several rounds of renegotiations (Sect. 4.3). Section 4.4
examines the impacts of different transfer schemes in the two-stage game.
We identify the equilibria by checking players’ incentives to leave or join the coalition for
every possible coalition. We are considering only a unique ICA and single deviations.
4.1 The One-shot Game
We start by presenting the results for the benchmark case with an initial negotiation and no
further renegotiations (R = 1). Table 1 gives results for two reference cases, the All-Single-
tons and the Grand Coalition, and for the only stable and Pareto undominated (renegotiation
proof) equilibrium, consisting of USA and China. The All-Singletons case reflects the non-
cooperative solution where no ICA is signed. It is a Nash equilibrium, but as it is Pareto
8 Nagashima et al. (2009) discuss and compare several transfer schemes. Their analysis shows that “optimal
transfers”, as suggested by e.g. Weikard (2009), would imply larger global abatements than other transfer
schemes. It is, however, not trivial how this extends to a setting with multiple commitment periods. How opti-
mal transfers can be designed in a setting with renegotiations is the topic of a companion paper, see Weikard
and Dellink (2008).
9 Nagashima et al. (2009) show that a transfer scheme based on the baseline path of emissions outperforms
transfers based on a historical base year in terms of stability, global payoffs and abatement.
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Fig. 1 Emission paths for USA and China—key results for selected coalitions. Note: emissions for USA-All
Singletons and USA-RPE almost overlap
dominated by the equilibrium coalition (USA, China), it is not renegotiation proof. The
Grand Coalition represents full cooperation. It is not an equilibrium since all regions (except
EET, EEX and China) have positive incentives to free-ride (indicated in column 6 of Table 1).
The first observation from Table 1 is that abatement and payoffs differ substantially across
regions. Under All-Singletons China abates the most, both in absolute and relative terms, i.e.
as percentage of its own baseline emissions. The main beneficiary of the global abatement
efforts is the EU-15, as they have the highest marginal benefits from abatement (see Appendix
2). This result does not include transfers as under All-Singletons each region bears the full
cost of their abatement efforts.
Secondly, the three regions with the lowest marginal abatement costs, China, USA and
India, adopt high relative levels of abatement in all coalitions. This reflects the maximisation
of regional net benefits in the non-cooperative case. Under cooperation marginal abatement
costs are equalised across participating regions. This requires a larger effort by regions with
low abatement cost. In all scenarios, the USA remains the largest emitter, even though their
abatement levels are high. This reflects the large share of the USA in global emissions of
GHGs in the benchmark projection. Global emission levels are increasing over time and a
stabilisation of emissions will not occur, not even under the Grand Coalition. Figure 1 shows
emissions paths for USA and China for the Baseline, under All-Singletons, the coalition
(USA, China; indicated as RPE) and the Grand Coalition.
Thirdly, under All-Singletons the differences in marginal abatement costs (not reported in
the table) imply that benefits from cooperation can be reaped. The gains from cooperation are
large: the net present value of payoff from abatement of the Grand Coalition increases roughly
threefold compared to the non-cooperative case; abatement levels of the Grand Coalition are
almost five times larger than All-Singletons abatement. These increased abatement efforts are
not in the interest of all regions, however. Though abatement percentages are decreasing over
time, especially for quickly growing regions such as China, the huge abatement efforts put
on the regions with low marginal abatement costs may be optimal from a global perspective,
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but will not be in the interest of China unless financial compensation by regions that benefit
from abatement efforts can be arranged. The compensation payments defined by the surplus
sharing rule, however, are so large that Japan and the European Union have strong incentives
to leave the Grand Coalition.10 The only regions that have no incentive to leave the Grand
Coalition are Eastern European Countries (EET), Energy Exporters (EEX) and China; all
other 9 regions would be better off when free-riding. This sheds some light on the possibility
of issue linking. In order to stabilise the Grand Coalition benefits from cooperation in other
fields such as removal of trade barriers, for example, must offset the incentive to change
membership for those 9 regions that prefer to leave.
Fourthly, the stable coalition of USA and China improves over the All-Singletons case,
both in terms of abatement and payoff. Abatement efforts are larger for the coalition mem-
bers. Other regions do not change their abatement efforts as they have dominant strategies,
given the constant marginal benefits in our specification. All regions do, however, benefit
from the additional abatement by the coalition members and thus payoffs are higher than in
the All-Singletons case for all regions. In fact, the region that benefits most from this coalition
is the European Union, as its benefits increase the most and its abatement costs remain the
same as in the All-Singletons case. A large gap remains between the stable coalition (USA,
China) and the Grand Coalition and only about 25% of the potential gains from cooperation
can be reaped.
Fifthly, all other possible coalitions violate either internal or external stability. This indi-
cates strong free-rider incentives. All regions benefit from other players’ provision of the
public good, but have limited incentives to contribute. Only a few coalitions are internally
stable and these consist of no more than three regions.
4.2 Results for the Two-stage Renegotiation Game with Transfers
When we introduce a renegotiation round, the possibility to change membership between
both periods emerges. When more than one RPE arises in the second stage of the game, there
are credible possibilities to force regions to cooperate in the first stage (cf. Sect. 2). It turns
out that in the two-stage game the equilibria that emerge in the second stage are all dominated
by the equilibrium (USA, China). Thus, we have a unique RPE at stage two. Consequently,
there are no credible punishment strategies and the same equilibrium arises in the first stage.
The RPE of the two-stage game is a sequence of coalitions consisting of USA and China in
both stages. As reported in Table 2, this result is robust with respect to the renegotiation time
(i.e. whether renegotiations occur after 20, 40, 50, 60 or 80 years), but it is not robust with
respect to the frequency of renegotiations as we will show below.
Table 3 offers a closer look at the coalition (USA, China) in the game with two periods of
50 years each. Due to low marginal abatement costs, China will take on a large share of the
abatement effort. In percentages, these are especially large in the early years when China’s
emissions are still relatively low (compare Tables 1 and 3). In contrast, the abatement percent-
age of the USA in 2011 is only a little above the level of the All-Singletons case; cf. Fig. 1.
Thus, the main mechanism that governs this result is that China takes the additional benefits
in the USA into account and abates more, financed by the USA, similar to the adoption of
the Clean Development Mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol.
10 The gross payoff without transfers for these two regions is positive and large in the Grand Coalition.
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Table 3 Two-stage game (R = 2): key results for the sustained coalition of USA and China in the game with
renegotiations after 50 years











2011 2061 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 2011 2061
USA 11.4 7.5 716 603 −109 −92 28.5 46.6
JPN 2.5 2.6 800 654 −234 −187 17.1 27.9
EU15 7.6 5.7 1, 067 873 −213 −175 23.4 38.1
OOE 5.6 2.9 160 131 −25 −17 3.4 5.6
EET 4.4 2.8 60 49 −3 −3 1.3 2.1
FSU 6.7 5.0 309 253 −38 −40 6.7 10.9
EEX 1.9 1.7 139 114 −12 −11 3.0 4.8
CHN 42.5 23.0 250 199 −87 −64 28.5 46.6
IND 10.5 5.1 229 187 −38 −27 4.9 8.1
DAE 1.9 1.6 116 95 −16 −14 2.5 4.0
BRA 0.1 0.1 71 58 −16 −13 1.5 2.5
ROW 6.3 4.4 312 255 −47 −40 6.7 11.0
As the same coalition arises in both stages of the game, these results are directly compa-
rable to the RPE in the one-shot game: for instance, the net present value of the payoff of
both stages adds up to the payoff in the one-shot game. The differences in regional emissions
over time makes the incentive structures different for both stages, but these differences are
not decisive and the same renegotiation proof coalition exists in both stages.
Finally, Table 3 shows the marginal abatement costs for each region in 2011 and 2061.
Optimality requires that the marginal abatement costs of the coalition members are equal.
They are higher than the marginal abatement costs under All-Singletons because coalition
members account for the positive externalities accruing to other members. The development
of the marginal abatement costs over time is driven by the increase in marginal benefits of
abatement in a growing economy. Recall that damages from GHG emissions are a share of
global GDP; see Eq. 7. With decreasing marginal abatement costs (for any given abatement
level) due to technological progress abatement levels will rise over time.
4.3 Extensions to Three and More Stages—Increasing the Frequency of Negotiations
Increasing the frequency of renegotiations may have an impact on the equilibria that emerge
in the different stages. With more frequent renegotiations, the stages are shorter. The calcu-
lation of payoffs using all future benefits from current abatement (cf. Sect. 3) guarantees that
the shorter stages do not lead to myopic behaviour by the players. We expect that increasing
the number of renegotiations may enhance stability of larger coalitions in the earlier stages
when multiple subgame RPE arise in later stages. In this case, consider the RPE of the stage
r subgame that gives the lowest payoff of all RPEs of that subgame to a certain region. This
RPE can be used as a threat to enforce the cooperation of that region at the preceding stage
r − 1.
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In fact, once we incorporate multiple rounds of renegotiations (R > 2), each with equal
length, several renegotiation proof equilibria emerge. The RPEs that perform best in terms
of net present value of global payoff aggregated over all stages are reported in Table 4.
The game with three rounds of negotiations has a unique RPE in the third stage, again
consisting of USA and China. In the second stage this RPE is, however, no longer unique.
The coalition of EU15 with the Eastern European countries and China emerges as a second
equilibrium. Even though it is inferior from a global perspective, it is preferred by all regions
except EU15. Hence, it is Pareto undominated. This implies that all regions other than EU15
can be threatened by forming the coalition (USA, China) in the second stage. Thus, a number
of RPEs with EU15, EET and China in the second and USA and China in the third stage
emerge. In contrast, we find only two equilibria with USA and China in the second stage, as
only if EU15 can be punished in this setting. In the 3-stage game an initial announcement of
the USA to sign in the second stage if and only if EU15 signs in the first stage is credible. If
EU15 would not sign, then the best RPE of the stage-2 subgame for the USA is the coalition
(EU15, EET, China) followed by (USA, China) in stage 3. Hence, the USA do not have an
incentive to deviate from this punishment strategy.
The 4-stage game leads to similar results as the 3-stage game. In the later part of the
century, i.e. in the last two stages, a unique RPE of USA and China exists while there is
room for multiple RPEs in the earlier stages and thus a range of equilibria in the first stage.
Although the numerical results differ, the incentive mechanism is the same as for the 3-stage
game. The uniqueness of the RPE at the stage-3 subgame (stretching over stages 3 and 4)
can be seen as an extended stage 3. In our setting this implies that the relatively ambitious
ICAs that emerge in first commitment period are maintained only for a shorter time (25 years
instead of 33 years) and total payoffs over the entire model horizon are slightly lower than in
the three-stage game. Hence, more frequent renegotiations do not necessarily lead to better
outcomes.
The situation changes when there are five stages in the game, i.e. renegotiations every
20 years. In this case, the coalition of USA and China is again unique in the last two stages of
the game, while two RPE arise for the third stage: USA and China or EU15, EET and China.
The main difference with the games with fewer stages is that there are now three consecutive
stages with multiple RPE. Essentially, the two equilibria in the third stage induce a range of
equilibria in the second stage, and thereby the possibilities to set incentives for cooperation
in the first stage become much larger.
The equilibria reported in Table 4 are the best performing ones in terms of net present
value of global payoff (and given the characteristics of our model also in terms of GHG con-
centrations). In most cases, these involve coalitions with China, as the marginal abatement
costs are lowest in this country. There are, however, in total 1,542 RPEs, with many different
coalition members in the first stage. Even some stable 10-player coalitions emerge at the
initial stage.
It is worth noting that the Grand Coalition is not stable at any stage, which is hardly sur-
prising as free-rider incentives increase with the number of coalition members. Punishment
strategies are insufficient to overcome these in the 5-stage game. At the first stage the best
performing RPE achieves 64% of the gains the Grand Coalition would achieve at that stage
but over a century it achieves only 36% of the gains of the Grand Coalition.
Finally, in Table 5 the incentives to change announcement are given for the best performing
RPE in the 5-stage game. These incentives are expressed in net present value, calculated back
to 2010, and can, hence, be directly compared. The development of these incentives is a mix-
ture of several mechanisms, including technological progress and increasing emissions and
abatement levels over time.
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Table 5 Five-stage game: incentives to change announcement (NPV; billion US$) in the best performing
RPE (coalition members in bold)
1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage 4th Stage 5th Stage
USA 86 −33 −19 −38 −34
JPN −290 −115 −97 −78 −67
EU15 −309 −5 −16 −73 −62
OOE −31 −8 −4 −7 −6
EET 3 1 −2 −1 −1
FSU 37 −12 −12 −17 −15
EEX 11 −1 0 −5 −4
CHN −58 −58 −52 −27 −21
IND −54 −12 −7 −11 −10
DAE 17 −5 −3 −6 −5
BRA −19 −7 −5 −5 −5
ROW 50 −16 −13 −17 −14
From the table the impact of the punishment strategies can be clearly seen. In the first
stage, 6 out of the 7 coalition members are threatened into collaboration: their incentives to
leave the coalition are positive, but smaller than the threat that an inferior coalition is played
in later stages. The table also shows that the European Union and Japan are much better off
outside the coalition in the first stage than inside.
4.4 Changing the Transfer Scheme
Previous studies, including Nagashima et al. (2009), have shown that the transfer scheme
adopted can have major impacts on the stability of coalitions. The outcomes of our 2-stage
game with a surplus sharing rule are compared with outcomes of transfers resulting from
tradable emission permits and with the no-transfers situation. The tradable permit system is
interesting as it is part of the Kyoto Protocol. The no-transfers situation serves as a bench-
mark. In order to keep the analysis comparable across scenarios we assume that the permits
are distributed to coalition members according to baseline emissions.
Table 6 shows that the transfer scheme influences the coalition members in the RPE, but in
all cases one unique RPE emerges with two coalition members. Introducing a tradable emis-
sion permit system as the transfer scheme substantially alters the incentive structures of the
regions. Regions with low marginal abatement costs will be able to sell emission permits and
thus increase their net benefits, while regions with high marginal abatement costs may want
to buy permits. Therefore, EU15, with high marginal benefits and high marginal abatement
costs, prefers to trade with China (low marginal abatement costs). EU15 buys emission per-
mits to combine high global abatement efforts with low regional abatement levels, whereas
China can gain from selling permits. The USA is a much less attractive partner for China, as
the USA has ample opportunities to reduce emissions at low costs domestically. Therefore,
the equilibrium permit price in a market consisting of USA and China will be lower.
When no transfer scheme is adopted China can no longer benefit from the transfers, and
thus it has no incentives to join a coalition. Consequently, the two regions with the largest
incentives to stimulate abatement, Japan and EU15, are forced to cooperate without partners,
and as their marginal abatement costs are relatively high, their ambition level is low. The coa-
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Table 6 Influence of the transfer scheme on the Renegotiation Proof Equilibria




Surplus sharing (base case) USA, China USA, China 7,700 1,425
Tradable permits EU-15, China EU-15, China 7,667 1,425
No transfers Japan, EU-15 Japan, EU-15 5,486 1,445
Note: Each simulation generates one unique Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium
lition of Japan and EU15 hardly improves the global payoff compared to the non-cooperative
outcome.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this final section we would like to turn to the policy implications of our findings. Before
we do so we summarise the main findings and we discuss some limitations of our modelling
approach.
This paper develops a framework to determine the RPE coalitions in a dynamic model of
coalition formation. In order to gain a better understanding of international climate agree-
ments we consider heterogeneous players, reflecting the differences of marginal benefits and
costs of abatement between regions. Coalition formation helps to exploit low cost abatement
options in some regions. We focus on the impacts of renegotiations on the stability of interna-
tional climate agreements in a setting of asymmetric countries explicitly including the option
of transfers among coalition members. Because a full analytical analysis of stability with
asymmetric regions and renegotiations is so far impeded by the complexity of the situation,
we develop a dynamic version of the STACO model (STACO 2.2) that comprises costs and
benefits of greenhouse gas abatement for 12 world regions and allows for renegotiations and
transfers. We apply a numerical analysis to test whether coalitions are renegotiation proof in
a number of settings.
We find that in the absence of transfers renegotiations do not lead to large or ambitious
coalitions. In a setting with transfers and with a limited number of renegotiations we find a
unique RPE, the coalition of the USA and China. More interesting are the results for scenar-
ios with a larger number of rounds of renegotiations. We find multiple renegotiation proof
equilibria with more ambitious ICAs in early stages of the game. In the later stages only
the coalition of the USA and China survives as an equilibrium of the subgame. The general
pattern—large coalitions initially, but small coalitions later—concurs with the findings of
Rubio and Ulph (2007). However, what drives this result is quite different in our setting.
Rubio and Ulph study a difference game with identical players, an infinite time horizon, a
stock pollutant and a convex damage function. Because players are assumed to be identical,
only the number, not the identity, of coalition members matters for the development of the
stock of the pollutant. Rubio and Ulph use a “random assignment rule” to determine which
player is a member at any given stage. This rules out the use of punishment schemes. Their
result, declining membership over time, is entirely driven by an increase of the stock of
the pollutant over time which implies increasing marginal damages and, hence, increasing
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(potential) gains from cooperation and increasing free-rider incentives.11 In our case the
decline of participation and abatement over time is driven by declining threats. With a finite
time horizon—reflecting finite fossil fuel reserves—there is no credible threat of punishment
at the last stage. The stability of larger coalitions at an early stage is driven by the existence
of multiple equilibria of the relevant subgame that can serve as credible threats.
Turning now to the limitations of our analysis we would like to mention four major issues.
The first two issues concern the rules of the game, the third concerns the solution concept
and the fourth is more policy oriented. First, notice that we obtain results for a given transfer
rule—surplus sharing proportional to baseline emissions. Transfers are limited to coalition
members and are arranged within a given commitment period. We do not explore in this
paper how a transfer scheme may emerge from the negotiation process and we not explore
how transfers can be used to create incentives for coalition membership. The former can be
addressed in a bargaining framework, cf. Caparrós et al. (2004). The latter is explored in a
companion paper to this paper, cf. Weikard and Dellink (2008).
Second, the rules of our game do not allow for the co-existence of multiple coalitions. A full
numerical analysis of all possible multi-coalition structures with several rounds of renegoti-
ations is practically impossible due to combinatorial complexity. The case where two agree-
ments coexist has been explored by Asheim et al. (2006). Their finding is that global abatement
levels would be higher with two regional agreements in place of one global agreement. The
challenge for future research is to push forward model analyses that are rich enough to cap-
ture the main options available in climate policy-making, such as regional agreements and
well-designed transfer schemes, while maintaining analytical tractability. Clearly, “small”
analytical models and “large” integrated assessment models must complement each other.
Third, and related to the previous issue, we employ a refined Nash equilibrium as a solu-
tion concept. The refinements, subgame perfectness and renegotiation proofness, maintain
the presumption that players consider deviations always individually, never collectively. Of
course, in climate politics there is nothing that rules out collective action of various groups
of countries such as e.g. the collaboration of G77 and China.
Fourth, in our model there is no cost of leaving the ICA. In practice a country that joins
makes a political commitment. Typically, leaving the ICA would involve a cost and this
would support internal stability of any ICA.
Given the limitations of our scenario analysis, conclusions for climate policies must be
drawn with care. We can however point to a number of insights from our study. The first is,
of course, that the prospect of renegotiation matters. In our setting, future play offers options
to impose threats that set incentives to join an ICA at an earlier stage. Many studies have
argued that effective climate coalitions will not be stable (e.g. Barrett 1994; Finus et al. 2006;
Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus 2006). Our analysis shows that with heterogeneous players
and a transfer scheme that shares the gains from cooperation it is possible to exploit some
of the low cost abatement options. This fact, in combination with additional incentives that
emerge from credible threats under renegotiations leads to ICAs that can capture 36% of the
potential gains from cooperation over a century, with 64% of the potential gains of the first
stage in our model with five renegotiation stages. These results are far less bleak than what
is suggested in the literature on self-enforcing environmental agreements. Moreover, even
better results seem to be possible if the transfer scheme is specifically designed to stimulate
membership and if multiple agreements are considered.
11 It is well-known in the literature on international environmental agreements that gains from cooperation
are coupled with free-rider incentives, cf. Barrett (1994).
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The inspection of our results suggests that more frequent negotiations generate a larger
number of equilibria that can be used to set incentives. Although this is generally true, there is
a drawback. More frequent negotiations do not necessarily lead to more effective agreements.
Although threats are larger with more frequent negotiations, the corresponding commitment
periods are shorter. The gains from stabilising a larger coalition (if there is any) can be cap-
tured only for a shorter period. This can be seen when comparing 3 rounds with 4 rounds of
negotiation (see Table 4).
Furthermore, in our applied setting we find powerful incentives for the EU15 and USA
to exploit the prospect of renegotiations strategically and coerce cooperative behaviour of
the other (while free-riding themselves). Such strategic possibilities will only be temporary,
however, as the incentives to cooperate change with every round of renegotiation.
The bottom line of our analysis is that a clear prospect for future renegotiations may help
to bring about an early effective agreement.
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Appendix 1
Each stage game of our greenhouse renegotiation game explained in Sect. 2 consists of a
coalition formation game and a GHG abatement game. Here we show that the latter has
a unique interior solution under STACO specifications (see Box 1). The GHG abatement
game is a difference game where each player fixes a sequence of abatement levels for the
relevant renegotiation period. Hence, we consider the abatement levels qi,t for each player
i at each time t , with t (r) ≤ t < t (r + 1). First notice that the abatement game is played
by the coalition (acting as one player) and |N | − |K| other players. Each player chooses an
abatement path 〈qi〉t (r+1)−1t (r) which is a best response to other players’ abatement paths. In
the STACO specification, according to Eqs. 6 and 7, the stock of GHGs is linear in abatement
and damages are linear in stock of GHGs. Therefore, marginal benefits Eq. 11 do not depend
on others’ abatement, i.e. each player has a dominant strategy. Along an optimal abatement
path it must hold that discounted marginal benefits from current abatement equal discounted
marginal abatement cost from current abatement at any time t , i.e.
(1 + ρ)−t · B ′i,t (qt ) = (1 + ρ)−t · C′i,t (qi,t ). (A1)
Furthermore, we have C′i,t (0) = 0 while B ′i,t > 0 for all qi,t ∈ [0, e¯i,t ] and C′i,t (e¯i,t ) >
B ′i,t (e¯i,t ). Together with the strict convexity of the abatement cost function this guarantees a
unique interior solution.
Appendix 2
See Tables 7 and 8.
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Gton (share) θi αi βi
USA 1.763 (0.238) 0.226 0.0005 0.0398
JPN 0.344 (0.046) 0.173 0.0155 1.8160
EU15 0.943 (0.127) 0.236 0.0024 0.1503
OOE 0.360 (0.049) 0.035 0.0083 0
EET 0.226 (0.030) 0.013 0.0079 0.0486
FSU 0.774 (0.104) 0.068 0.0023 0.0042
EEX 0.469 (0.063) 0.030 0.0032 0.3029
CHN 1.127 (0.152) 0.062 0.00007 0.0239
IND 0.344 (0.046) 0.050 0.0015 0.0787
DAE 0.316 (0.043) 0.025 0.0047 0.3774
BRA 0.122 (0.016) 0.015 0.5612 8.4974
ROW 0.637 (0.086) 0.068 0.0021 0.0805
World 7.425 ( = 1) ( = 1)
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